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Recent Decisions
DoMEsTxc RELATIONS - AcTIoN BY MNOR FOR DEPRIVATION
OF FATHER'S SocIETY
Plaintiff, a minor, sued paternal grandparents to recover for the
loss of "love, affections, society, guidance and companionship of his
father," who was maliciously and wilfully induced by the defendants
to break up plaintiff's home and family. The trial court sustained
the defendant's general demurrer. On appeal, held, affirmed. This
action was unknown at common law and there is in Ohio no statu-
tory authority for it. The court will not encroach upon the legisla-
ture's right to create new legal rights and remedies. Gleitz, III V.
Gleitz, Sr. et. al., 59 Ohio L. Abs. 186 (1951).
While this action by a minor is unknown in Ohio, the similar
action for alienation of affections has long been recognized as a right
belonging to the husband, Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327,
98 N.E. 102 (1912), and to the wife, Westlake -v. Westlake, 34 Ohio
St. 621 (1878). The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Westlake v. West-
lake, supra, recognized this right in the wife although it was un-
known at common law and there was no specific statutory authority
for it.
An action by minor children was allowed in the leading case of
Daily v. Parker, 152 F. 2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). In this case the court
developed what has come to be known as the "Family Unit" theory;
each member of the family being entitled to the society and com-
panionship of the others. Judge Evans continued: "Our conclusion
.... is that a child today has a right enforceable in a court of law,
against one who has invaded and taken from said child the support
and maintenance of its father, as well as damages for the destruction
of other rights which arise out of the family relationship and which
have been destroyed or defeated by a wrongdoing third party. Like-
wise, we are persuaded that because such rights have not heretofore
been recognized, is not a conclusive reason for denying them ....
In the absence of a state court ruling our duty is tolerably clear. It
is to decide, not avoid the question."
Other well reasoned cases have followed this approach. Russick
v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W. D. Mich. 1949); Miller v. Monsen, 228
Minn. 400, 37 N. W. 2d 543 (1949); Johnson et. al. v. Luhman, 330
Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E. 2d 810 (1947).
In what is now the majority view, however, other courts have
denied the action. Nelson v. Richwagen, 95 N.E. 2d 545 (Mass.
1950); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 161, 56 A. 2d 768 (1947);
EdIer v. MacAlphine-Downie, 180 F. 2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Katz
v. Katz, 197 Misc. 412, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 863 (1950); Hinson v. Thomas,
231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E. 2d 432 (1949); Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App.
RECENT DECISIONS
2d 454, 190 P. 2d 984 (1948) (based on California Statutes); Garza
v. Garza, 209 S.W. 2d 1012 (Texas 1948); McMillan v. Taylor, 160
F. 2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134,
273 N.Y.S. 912 (1934).
Various reasons have been assigned for this view. Some of the
cases specifically deny that the court has the power to indulge in
"judical empiricism." Hinson v. Thomas, supra; Garza v. Garza,
supra; Edler v. MacAlpine-Downie, supra. Other cases deny the
action for policy reasons. Chief among them are: fear that a mul-
tiplicity of suits would result, Morrow v. Yannantuono, supra; fear
that to permit the action would open the door to fraud and extortion,
Katz v. Katz, supra; and fear that the children's damages would be
duplicated by being taken into consideration in an action by the par-
ent as well as in the action by the child, Morrow v. Yannantuono,
supra. Some note that the adoption in twelve states of "Heart-balm"
acts, indicates a social trend against allowance of the action, Taylor
v. Keefe, supra; but see Russick v. Hicks, supra. For a discussion
of the policy arguments for allowing the action see Comment, 20
CoaR. L. Q. 255 (1935). For a discussion of the policy arguments
against allowing the action see Comment, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 276
(1934).
The principal case adds little that is new to this particular field
of the law. Its main importance is that it is the first decision on this
question on the appellate level in Ohio.
Robert A. Strickling
PRocEDUn - ATTAClnvZENT IN ACTiON AGAINST NoN-
RESIDENT - WimN ACTION CoMvMINcEs
In an action against a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the state of Ohio, plaintiff filed, on January 3rd, its pe-
tition, precipe for summons, and affidavit in attachment. On the
same date, the summons was returned "not found" and an order of
attachment was served on the defendant garnishee. The first pub-
lication was made on January 5th. On appeal, held, affirmed. The
order of attachment was valid although it was issued before the date
of first publication. Consumers Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Chicago
Pottery Co., 155 Ohio St. 373, 98 N.E. 2d 823 (1951).
Section 11819 of the Ohio General Code states that attachment
is proper in a civil action "at or after its commencement." Two other
sections deal with the commencement of an action. Section 11230
of the Ohio General Code provides that "An action shall be deemed
to be commenced within the meaning of this chapter, as to each de-
fendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him....
When service by publication is proper, the action shall be deemed
to be commenced at the date of the first publication, if it be regu-
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larly made." (Emphasis supplied.) This section appears in the
chapter concerning the statute of limitations.
Section 11279 of the Ohio General Code states that "A civil
action must be commenced by filing ... a petition, and causing a
summons to be issued thereon." The question, here, is which of
these sections defines commencement within the meaning of Section
11819 of the Ohio General Code.
Prior to 1936, the Ohio courts held that an order of attachment
issued before the date of first publication was valid, provided that
the action had been commenced by filing a petition and causing a
summons to issue thereon, as provided in Section 11279. Seibert v.
Switzer, 35 Ohio St. 661 (1880); St. John v. Parsons, 54 Ohio App.
420, 7 N. E. 2d 1013 (1936). Shortly thereafter, two removal cases
arose in the federal courts, and the U. S. Supreme Court, in Rorick
v. Devon Syndicate, Ltd., 307 U. S. 299 (1939), held that the posi-
tion of the Ohio courts was that Section 11230 merely applied to
questions of the statute of limitations, and that Section 11279 pro-
vided for the commencement of the action for purposes of attach-
ment. In so holding, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court
of Appeals in that case, and overruled the earlier case of Doherty v.
Fleming, 83 F. 2d 388 (6th Cir. 1936). This put the federal courts
in line with the traditional Ohio view.
Two cases arose on similar questions in the state courts upon
which appellant relied in the instant case. In Crandall v. Irwin, 139
Ohio St. 463, 40 N.E. 2d 933 (1942), the Ohio Supreme Court held
that Section 11279 prescribed the manner of commencing an action,
while Section 11230 prescribed the time of commencement. In that
case plaintiff was seeking to foreclose a mechanic's lien, and had
filed his petition and precipe, but service was not made before the
statutory six year period had run. The lien was dissolved, the court
holding that this was a question of the time of commencement, so
that Section 11230 applied. Judge Turner's statement in the opinion
that the construction of Ohio statutes by the federal courts in the
Doherty and Rorick cases, supra, would have no influence on the
Ohio Supreme Court, is interesting as a matter of statutory con-
struction.
In the second case, Pilgrim Distributing Corp. v. Galsworthy,
Inc., 148 Ohio St. 567, 76 N.E. 2d 382 (1947), plaintiff filed its affi-
davit in attachment along with the petition and precipe, and the
order of attachment was issued immediately. The evidence showed,
however, that the summons was not issued at any time, and that an
affidavit for service by publication was not filed until some two
weeks later. The court held that the attachment was void as it had
been levied before the cause of action was commenced inasmuch
as no summons had been issued. The dictum in the case that if
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there had been publication it would not be necessary to have the
summons issued has some support in Ohio. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 69
Ohio App. 447, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 441 (1941); Smith v. Whittlesey, 19
Ohio C. C. 412, 10 Ohio C. D. 377 (1899). Contra: Central Savings
Bank v. Langenbach, 1 Ohio N.P. 124 (1894).
In the instant case, the Crandall and Pilgrim cases, supra, were
both distinguished. It was held that the Crandall case dealt with the
limitation of an action, so that Section 11230, the statute of limita-
tions section, applied. The Pilgrim case was distinguished on the
facts, in that no summons was issued before the order of attachment.
The effect of the instant case is to lend support to the practice
of filing together the petition, precipe, affidavit for constructive
service, and affidavit in attachment.
Paul M. Smart
WILLS - EVmENCE - OPmoNs OF WITNESSES AS
TO MWTAL CAPACrTY
In a will contest the trial court permitted witnesses to answer
the question, "Tell the jury whether or not, in your opinion, Walter
Yochum was able to dispose of his property by last will and testa-
ment?" The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, held, reversed.
Witnesses may not give their opinions as to the ability of a testator
to dispose of his property by will. Gottfried v. Yochum, 155 Ohio St.
283, 98 N.E. 2d 821 (1951).
That opinions as to testamentary capacity are inadmissable has
long been the recognized rule in Ohio. Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St.
1, 86 Am. Dec. 459 (1864); Gillespie v. Gray, 38 Ohio L. Abs. 145,
49 N. E. 2d 108 (1943). The great majority of other jurisdictions are
in accord. Shneider v. Manning, 121 IMI. 376, 12 N. E. 267 (1887);
Re Ferguson, 239 Mich. 616, 215 N.W. 51 (1927); see 155 A.L.R.
284; 57 Am. Jur. 122; 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 595.
The instant case states that there is "a long existing and well
established rule in this jurisdiction." Nevertheless the issue has
been often litigated in Ohio which indicates that the "rule" is still
not clear. The cause of the confusion is that the courts have used
several rationales. Clearly the correct hypothesis for ruling out
questions concerning testamentary capacity is that they call for
opinions involving mixed issues of law and fact. Most jurisdictions
have adopted this rationale. Coblentz v. Putifer, 87 Kan. 719, 125
Pac. 30 (1912); Farrell v. Brennan, 32 Mo. 328, 82 Am. Dec. 137
(1862); see notes 155 A.L.R. 285; 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 595; 57 Am. Jur.
122. Though in proper cases witnesses should be permitted to give
opinions as to facts, they should not be permitted to say that those
facts meet a legal standard, for witnesses cannot know what the
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proper legal standard is. In the instant case, how is the witness to
know what the legal requirements for testamentary capacity are?
A study of the Ohio cases dealing with the issue shows that each of
them could have been settled on this ground alone.
Some of the questions Ohio courts have held incompetent are:
"Do you think that she had the capacity for making a will?" Gilles-
pie v. Gray, supra. "Whether testatrix was competent to make a
will?" Kahler v. Cowden, 4 Ohio L. Abs. 501 (1926). "I will ask
you if, in your judgment, from what you saw and learned of John
Crowe, he had sufficient mind and memory to make a proper testa-
mentary disposition of his property on the date you saw him?"
Burns v. Crowe, 31 Ohio C.A. 566 (1920). "Do you think that Mr.
Fink had the mental capacity to comprehend the nature of the act
he was performing?" Shuey v. Fink, 26 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 106
(1915). These questions are clearly incompetent since, before the
witness could answer, them he would have to apply the legal stand-
ard of testamentary capacity to the factual capacity which in his
opinion the testator possessed. The witness cannot know the ca-
pacity which the law requires.
The following questions have been approved by the Ohio courts:
"Was Weis, during the times you observed him, rational or irra-
tional? Was he of sound or unsound mind? Did he have sufficient
mind and memory to form an intent and purpose to dispose of his
property by will?" Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E. 2d 245
(1947). "You may state, doctor, whether or not Charles K. Jacoby
... had sufficient mind and memory to understand the nature of
business which required him to comprehend generally the nature
and extent of his property; to understand the nature of the business
in which he was engaged; to hold in his mind the names and identity
of those who have claims upon his bounty, and to be able to appreci-
ate his relations to the members of his family." Brown v. Jacoby,
55 Ohio App. 250, 9 N.E. 2d 693 (1936). "Whether, in your opinion,
testator possessed sufficient understanding to transact ordinary
business incident to the management of his property and household
affairs?" Baillie, Pxr. et at v. Heimsath Admr. et at, 20 Ohio App.
216, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 570 (1925). "You may also further state whether
or not he had capacity to form a purpose and intention of disposing
of his property by will?" Dunlap, Exec. et at v. Dunlap et at, 89
Ohio St. 28 (1913). These questions are competent since they ask
only for opinions of factual ability or capacity and the witness needs
no knowledge of legal standards to answer them.
In Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1 (1864), regarded as the Ohio
authority on the issue, the court did adopt the correct rationale,
saying, "Such inquiry involves a matter of law; also assumes that
the witness knows the degree of capacity required to perform the
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act in issue." But the court did not stop there. It went on to say,
"This branch of the inquiry involved a question of law and fact, and,
to the extent that capacity was involved in the issue, the very ques-
tion to be determined by the jury." (Emphasis supplied). It is this
last phrase which has caused confusion. Considered in context it
means that the jury, not the witness, should apply the legal standard
to the facts, and of course even the jury must be told by the court
what the correct legal standard is. Unfortunately, in subsequent
litigation, courts and attorneys have used the phrase without dis-
criminating between questions purely of fact and those also involv-
ing legal standards. The phrase has come to mean that any opinion
determinative of the case is inadmissable, whether the opinion be
purely of fact or involves both facts and the law. Taken in that sense
the phrase is fallacious. To illustrate, in a simple negligence case
no defense attorney would object to a witness testifying that he saw
the defendant go through a red light, and if there should be an ob-
jection no court would sustain it. Yet if the jury should believe the
witness's testimony and apply to it the correct legal standard making
this negligence per se, one of the ultimate issues in the case is de-
cided. The same logic applies to other branches of the law includ-
ing will contests. In Bahl v. Byal et al, 90 Ohio St. 129 (1914) a
witness was correctly permitted to testify that in his opinion the
testator could not comprehend the "division and distribution of an
estate valued at about $70,000.00." Should the jury believe that
testimony and apply to it the proper legal standard for testamentary
capacity, they must necessarily conclude that the testator did not
have the legal capacity to make a will, and one of the ultimate issues
has in effect been answered by the witness.
The difficulty is not exclusive with Ohio, other jurisdictions too
have encountered it, and the modern trend is to abolish altogether
the use of "the ultimate question for the jury" as a rationale in any
branch of the law. U. S. Smelting Co. v. Parry, 166 Fed. 407 (8th
Cir. 1909); Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328,
5 N.W. 2d 646 (1942); see notes 78 A.L.R. 755; 20 Am. Jur. 654; 57
Am. Jur. 122. Text writers have been especially bitter in their con-
demnation of this rationale. 7 WGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1920, 1921 (3d
ed. 1940); 1 GRENmw, EviDE E § 441b (16th ed. 1899); MODEL
CODE OF EviDENcE, Rule 401 (1942); 20 Am. Jur. 654.
The instant decision is couched in the following terms, "Opinions
of such witnesses are not admissable where such opinions in fact
answer the ultimate question at issue and which is to be submitted
to the jury upon competent evidence for its decision." (Emphasis
supplied). The result of the case is correct, but does the court mean
that all opinions, even those purely of fact, which answer the ulti-
mate question at issue are incompetent, or does it really mean that
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only opinions involving law and fact are inadmissable? Considered
in the light of the results of past cases without regard to their lan-
guage, the instant decision condemns only mixed questions of law
and fact. Assuming this interpretation to be correct, the court's ra-
tionale as well as their result is clearly proper, but it would seem
that a more precise statement of that rationale by the court would
have aided greatly in clarifying the law and perhaps reducing future
litigation on the issue.
Leonard Goldberg
INSURANCE - DEATH WHILE IN VIOLATION OF LAW
Action by a beneficiary to recover on two policies of life insur-
ance providing in substance for payment on the death of the in-
sured. The insured, while engaged in the crime of armed robbery,
was shot and killed by his victim. The Superior Court found for
the defendant. On appeal, held, affirmed. Public policy forbids even
an innocent beneficiary of a life insurance policy from recovering on
the policy where the death is the result of the insured's own crim-
inal conduct. Malloy v. John Hancock Mutual Ins. Co., 97 N.E. 2d
422 (Mass. 1951).
The general view is that there can be recovery where the in-
sured is killed while violating the law unless there is an express
provision in the policy providing otherwise or the policy was ob-
tained with the commission of the illegal act in contemplation.
6 CoucH, INSURANCE § 1236 (1930); APPLEM=AN, INSURAN E LAW
AND PRACTICE § 511 (1941); VANCE, INSURANCE § 190 (3d ed. 1951).
In contrast to the general rule several jurisdictions deny re-
covery in certain circumstances even though there is no express
provision in the policy prohibiting recovery. The rule in the federal
courts, Burt v. Union Central Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362 (1902), and Eng-
land, Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh. N.S. 194 (1830), is that
the insurer does not have to pay if the deceased was executed for
a crime even though such risk is not expressly excepted in the policy.
The thought here is that the threat of cancellation of an insurance
policy would deter a person from committing a crime which carried
a death penalty. This rule has been criticized in that, in fact, it does
not deter crime. Fields v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 249 S.W.
2d 798 (1923); Weeks v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 122 S.E.
591 (1924); Collins v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542
(1907).
Some courts follow the decision in Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.
v. Guller, 68 Ind. App. 544, 119 N.E. 173 (1918), in saying that life
insurance policies can be divided into two types; (1) those pay-
able to the estate and (2) those payable to designated third parties
as beneficiaries. These courts hold that the third parties acquire a
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vested interest in the policy at the time of its issuance and there-
after their rights cannot be affected by the wrong of the insured, for
whose acts they are in no way responsible. According to this view
public policy does not excuse the insurer from liability when the
insured dies as a result of a violation of law and the beneficiary is
a third party but the insurer is excused when the beneficiary is the
estate because the estate is considered to be the same as the insured
and public policy prevents the insured from profiting by his own
wrong. Payne v. Louisiana Industrial Life Ins. Co., 33 So. 2d 444
(La. 1948). This distinction in life insurance policies was rejected
by the United States Supreme Court in Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234 (1911). The court held that the pol-
icy was "the measure of the rights of everyone thereunder."
Massachusetts, along with some other states, holds that the ex-
press provision prohibiting recovery when the death was due to a
violation of law is superfluous since it is just a statement of the con-
trolling public policy. Lubianez v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 323 Mass. 16,
79 N.E. 2d 876 (1948). The principal case is consistent with this
precedent.
The value of the principal case is in clearly showing Massa-
chusetts' position that public policy forbids recovery by an innocent
beneficiary when the insured is killed as a result of a violation of
law. Previous Massachusetts cases on this point were not as clear
as the principal case since they all contained something in the fact
situation that could bring them under one of the minority rules
previously mentioned. Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass.
550 (1876) was payable to the estate; DeMello v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 281 Mass. 190 183 N.E. 255 (1937), and
Lubianez v. Met. Life Ins. Co., supra, were both suits on a double
indemnity clause in the contract; and Millen v. John Hancock Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co., supra, was a case in which the death penalty was
inflicted.
The public policy argument that refusing payment to the bene-
ficiary when the insured is killed while violating the law will de-
crease crime seems weak to the writer. A person bent on doing
some illegal act would not be deterred by the fear that his insurance
policy would not be paid if he were to be killed. Payment is no
fraud on the insurance company since the rates are based on mor-
tality tables which are computed on the basis of actual deaths in-
cluding those caused by a violation of the law. VANCE, INsuRANcE
229 (2d ed. 1930). The better rule seems to be that the beneficiaries'
rights should be fixed by the terms of the policy and in the event
that there is no clause excepting death by violation of law the in-
surer should be liable.
William H. Schneider
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